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Introduction
Facing an abundance of product choices and related information, but with only limited time and attention to evaluate them, consumers have to come to grips with how much and what type of information to acquire and to pay attention to (and what to ignore), and make product choice and purchase decisions based on this partial information. It is therefore quite possible that consumers make "wrong" choices, but this does not necessarily imply that they are irrational. Since the works of Simon (1955 Simon ( , 1979 , bounded rationality acknowledges the fact that individuals make rational 4 Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) influence choice behavior. Specifically, we show that if a dominated option has a lower information cost, its addition to a set can increase choice probability of another option, providing a new plausible reason for the failure of regularity in choice behavior. By providing a precise description of rational choice behavior under limited attention and costly information, our model has the potential to guide product assortment and information provisioning strategies of firms.
The central and novel element of our model is the derivation of the total cost associated with the consumer's information processing strategy. Quantifying the amount of information the consumer acquires when evaluating a particular option and accounting for its cost is an intricate task in the presence of a non-uniform information cost structure, and this gets even more pronounced when there are similarities (i.e. correlations) between the products. This is because, as the consumer learns about a product, she may also learn about another product (and vice versa). Accordingly, there are two forms of information acquired by the consumer: (i) direct information that the consumer obtains by studying the particular option, and (ii) implied information that the consumer acquires about the option by studying another option. Since the unit costs of these sources might differ, it becomes important to glean from the consumer's information processing strategy the amount of information acquired from each source. The consumer should prioritize cheaper sources of information and should not attempt to obtain information about an option directly if that information can already be inferred from previously studied options. To exemplify the above, suppose there are two products, Product 1 and 2. Product 1 is available at a retail store the consumer is currently visiting, while Product 2 is not available there but sold elsewhere (e.g. online store) requiring extra travel/search effort for the consumer. The consumer knows that these products are very similar (in theory they can even be identical) and in line with the above description, the information cost is lower at the retail store. She should inquire about Product 1 only at the retail store (never at the online store), and this would also reveal significant information about Product 2. For Product 2, she should acquire (direct) information at the online store only to obtain information beyond the implied information that she can infer from Product 1 (already obtained at the retail store). We develop an information cost function that quantifies separately the amount of implied and direct information, and generalizes the Shannon entropy based cost functions utilized in the rational inattention literature. We derive this cost function from first principles, using an axiomatic approach.
We formulate the consumer's discrete choice problem based on this information cost function, and then determine the structure of the optimal solution. We show that the optimal choice behaviour can be described analytically in closed-form. We generalize the GMNL model in the sense that our choice model reduces to GMNL when the cost of information is uniform across all options. After establishing this result, we concentrate on a number of limiting cases involving infinite information costs, zero information costs, duplicate options, with the additional objective of highlighting some Author: Consumer Choice Under Limited Attention Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) 5 features of the optimal choice. Subsequently, we focus on an auxiliary example, the classical redbus/blue-bus problem, and illustrate the impact of multiple information channels and different costs on the choice behavior of consumers with limited attention.
Overview of literature
As noted earlier, the theory of rational inattention belongs to the literature of bounded rationality and receives significant interest in economics (Gabaix 2014) as well as psychology (Todd and Gigerenzer 2000) . Models can differ in the way information is acquired. In Reis (2006) the consumer either pays a fee to become fully informed or not, while in other models the consumer may decide on the degree of the precision to which she receives information (e.g. in the models of Verrecchia 1982, the consumer decides on the variance of the signals). The models conceived by Sims (1998) and later adopted by many other researchers generalize this approach, as they offer the consumer the opportunity to receive signals of any type and to improve her prior in every desirable way. Our paper follows this prominent stream of modeling rational inattention. The common feature is the modeling of the cost of information as a reduction of uncertainty with respect to the prior, where uncertainty is measured as Shannon entropy (Shannon 1948) . For a motivation of Shannon entropy as a measure of uncertainty and information, we refer the reader to the axiomatic treatment in Csiszár (2008) and to the excellent introduction by Cover and Thomas (2006) . To our knowledge, Matějka and McKay (2015) is the only application of rational inattention to discrete choice. We expand this literature by incorporating non-uniform information cost structure to the choice decision and characterizing the resulting optimal choice.
The fact that customers need to exercise differing levels of effort in order to get informed about different alternatives has been studied for multiple purposes in the context of both parallel and sequential search models. In parallel search, consumers form a fixed set (referred to as the consideration set) of options to evaluate, and make a choice from this set (e.g. Manzini and Mariotti 2014) .
In contrast, all options are kept on the table in rational inattention models. In sequential search models, consumers gather information about a particular product one-by-one (and possibly one attribute at a time), and purchase once they decide to stop collecting more information optimally (e.g. Weitzman 1979 , Branco et al. 2012 , Ke et al. 2016 . Rational inattention models differ in that no assumption is made on the process by which the consumer gets informed nor on the type or quantity of information acquired (the information strategy is fully endogenized).
Choice Model Formulation
In this section, we develop the choice model for a rationally inattentive consumer with different information costs across alternatives. The consumer can choose from the finite set of alternatives 6 Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) A = {1, . . . , n}. The state of nature is a random variable V taking values v ∈ R n , where v i denotes the value of alternative i ∈ A. The consumer has the prior belief p ∈ ∆ (R n ) where ∆ (R n ) denotes the set of all probability distributions on R n . In order to improve her decision, the consumer can process information with the goal of sharpening her belief about the state of nature. Let S = R n denote the signal space that is available to the consumer. Consistent with the theory of rational inattention, we assume that the consumer can set up any joint distribution f S,V of signals and values, given that it is consistent with her prior belief, i.e., the marginal of f with respect to V equals p,
Clearly, depending on the joint distribution of signals and values, the signal can be more or less beneficial. In particular, given the reception of signal s ∈R n , the consumer creates an updated belief f V|s over the values of the alternatives and chooses the alternative that gives the highest expected value under the updated belief, yielding the expected payoff
The less noise that remains in the updated belief, the more promising this choice becomes. Signals that reveal the true state and eliminate all uncertainty allow the consumer to make a perfect choice.
This would maximize the payoff
The consumer has no restrictions in choosing her information strategy as long as it is consistent with her priors, but information processing is costly. Specifically, information costs depend on the extent of the reduction of uncertainty, measured by entropy H. The a-priori entropy of the state of nature is given by
Receiving signal s yields a reduction of this entropy by
to the level of the entropy of the posterior belief f V|s . The expectation of this reduction over all signals is called mutual information between S and V under the joint distribution f , and is denoted by I f (V, S)
In particular, I f (V, S) quantifies the extent of what the consumer expects to learn about the state of nature from the signals.
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Extant literature assumes that the cost per unit of mutual information λ is uniform across all alternatives, and accordingly defines the total cost of information as C (f ) = λ · I f (V, S) . Matějka and McKay (2015) show that the information strategy optimizing the net pay-
results in a choice behavior that can be characterized as Generalized Multinomial Logit (GMNL).
Specifically, the conditional probability p (i | v) of choosing alternative i ∈ A when the state is v is given as
Here
represents the unconditional probability of selecting alternative i ∈ A. Note that p (i) are not exogenous parameters; they are part of the consumer's decision making strategy, capturing the effects of prior beliefs. When the consumer is a-priori indifferent to all alternatives (i.e., p(v) is invariant to all permutations of the elements of v), then p(i) = 1 n and (4) reduces to the standard MNL formula.
In this paper, we relax the uniform information cost assumption and let λ i denote the unit cost of acquiring information for alternative i. Without loss of generality, suppose that the alternatives are ordered such that λ 1 ≤ λ 2 ... ≤ λ n . At this point, one could speculate that the resulting conditional choice probabilities should resemble (4) with λ simply replaced with λ i for each alternative. This conjecture, however, turns out to be incorrect. As we show later, the conditional choice probabilities can still be characterized in closed-form similar to the GMNL formula, but the "attraction" term associated with each alternative is more involved.
The most crucial element of the rationally inattentive consumer's choice framework with nonuniform information costs is the development of a total information cost function based on mutual information that accounts for the sources of information. This is because the mutual information I f (V, S) generated from the information processing strategy of the consumer contains information about different alternatives, but these alternatives carry different costs. In contrast to the uniform cost case, it becomes necessary to be more precise about the way the consumer acquires information.
Conceptually, I f (V, S) is generated from a series of queries and their responses. Practically, this is tantamount to consumers studying the alternatives in some order, asking questions and updating beliefs accordingly. We do not specify the exact process by which information is acquired, but as noted earlier, we provide an axiomatic derivation of our cost function. This derivation is not limited to the case where information is measured as mutual information, i.e., as reduction of Shannon entropy. Thus, we provide a more general form in the next section before turning back to the entropy-based model in Section 3.2. 
Axiomatic derivation of the total information cost function
For an information strategy f and any set of alternatives D ⊆ A, let I(f, D) denote the information that is obtained from the information strategy if the scope of its application is limited to the alternatives in D. We adopt the convention I (f, ∅) = 0 and assume that the information measure I : ∆ (R 2n ) × 2 A → R + satisfies the following property:
) .
This intuitive requirement states that for any information strategy, the information obtained does not diminish when applied to a larger set of alternatives.
For a given vector of information prices λ and a given information measure I, the cost function
. We assume that an information strategy that does not provide any information costs nothing, i.e., denoting the no-
At the heart of the axiomatic derivation is the specification of how the cost of two information strategies differ, due to the differences in the amount of information obtained as well as its scope. By scope, we refer to the fact that information strategy change can be related to one particular alternative or to a combination of alternatives. In what follows, we cover each scenario separately.
We first deal with the scenario where the change in information strategy from f 1 to f 2 involves a particular alternative i ∈ A. Suppose that the information that is obtained about i increases by c ≥ 0, i.e., I (f 2 , {i}) = I (f 1 , {i}) + c. Moreover, suppose that the information that is obtained about i together with other alternatives increases by the same amount,
while there is no change in information about other alternatives or sets of alternatives that do not contain i, i.e., I (f 2 , E) = I (f 1 , E) for all E ⊆ A \ {i}. This means that the additional information is directly related to this particular alternative i. We therefore postulate that it is acquired at the unit cost of that alternative λ i . Formally, we have the following.
, c ∈ R, and i ∈ A. If the information obtained through f 1 and f 2 for every E ⊆ A is such that
We now deal with the scenario where the change in information strategy from f 1 to f 2 involves a set of alternatives D ⊆ A, |D| > 1. Suppose that the information that is obtained about D increases by 
This condition reflects a "conservative" but reasonable view on the costs of jointly inferred information. To see this more clearly, consider a bipartition of
The joint information that is obtained from pooling the insights obtained about the alternatives D 1 with the insights about the alternatives D 2 is given by
We call this joint information because this information can only be obtained when looking at the alternatives together. Then, whenever the condition of joint information costing holds, we have
since the information about proper subsets of D remains unchanged. According to the postulation, this additional joint information is acquired at unit cost max i∈D {λ i }. This is motivated by the understanding that the information channel associated with the most "costly" alternative is required in order to obtain this joint information.
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The following result characterizes the unique cost function satisfying these properties. 
Theorem 1 establishes that the two principles of information costing are characteristic to our cost function. 4 Strictly speaking, expanding the scope of joint information costing definition by including |D| = 1 would contain singular information costing as a special case. Effectively, the information cost function (5) captures the idea that the consumer does not try to obtain information that is already implied by previously studied options, and concentrates on obtaining direct information beyond what she already knows. Furthermore, she prioritizes cheaper alternatives (and information channels) in acquiring information.
Non-uniform cost function when information is reduction in Shannon entropy
As is standard in the literature, we now use mutual information as the measure of information.
, the cost function (5) defined in Theorem 1 becomes
where
The application of the chain rule of mutual information
where 
Furthermore, λ i = λ for all i ∈ A, implies C (f ) = λ·I f (V, S) and the total information cost function reduces to that in extant literature.
We now illustrate that the cost function derived in Corollary 1 represents a consumer who first learns from the cheapest source, then acquires additional information from the second cheapest source beyond what she already knows, and so on. In order to facilitate the explanation and to simplify the exposition, suppose that there are only two alternatives, Product 1 and Product 2, 4 Technically, for any given information strategy f , the cost function C I λ as a function on the domain of unit cost vectors R n + is in fact the Lovász extension (Lovász 1983 ) of the information measure I as a function on 2 A .
5 The conditional mutual information I f (Vi, S | V1··i−1) is often defined as the expected mutual information between Vi and S conditional on V1··i−1, i.e.,
The chain rule of mutual information guarantees that this definition is equivalent to the recursive definition in (6).
Author: Consumer Choice Under Limited Attention
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) 11 for which V = (V 1 , V 2 ) with 0 < λ 1 ≤ λ 2 < ∞. As Product 1 has a lower information cost, let us first focus on the information learned about Product 1 from the signals. To this end, let p V 1 and f V 1 |s denote the marginals of the prior and the posterior with respect to the value of Product 1.
By asking questions, the consumer receives signals that reduce the uncertainty of her knowledge of V 1 . This reduction is the difference between the prior and posterior entropies, i.e., the mutual information between S and V 1 , i.e., by the intersection of H (p V 1 ) and H (f S ). Note that in a similar vein, the mutual information
Figure 1 Relationship between entropy, mutual information and conditional mutual information
Since the signals that inform about Product 1 are processed through a channel that cost λ 1 per information unit 6 , the cost incurred by this activity is λ 1 I f (V 1 , S). When the consumer processes information through this channel and learns about Product 1, she typically also learns about 
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To quantify this information, we need to first determine the information learned about the entire state variable (V 1 , V 2 ) from the signal, i.e. I f ((V 1 , V 2 ), S) , which is given as the union of the intersection of H (p V 1 ) and H (p V 2 ) with H (f S ). Subtracting from this the information I f (V 1 , S) that the consumer already knows from Product 1, we get the mutual information between V 2 and S conditional on V 1 :
This additional information is acquired at a unit cost λ 2 , and the total cost of information becomes
The Venn diagram in Figure 1 aids in visualizing the relationship between mutual information and conditional mutual information among alternatives and signals and facilitates description of our cost function. It is important to recognize, however, that this relationship is more intricate than it may seem from the Venn diagram, even for the case with two alternatives. For example,
. This area can actually represent a negative
To see this more lucidly, consider the case where V 1 and V 2 are independent. Then, there is no mutual information between V 1 and V 2 , i.e., I (V 1 , V 2 ) = 0 and knowing V 1 does not reveal anything about V 2 . It seems quite plausible
However, this is not true. Even though V 1 and V 2 are a-priori independent, they typically do "become" dependent because of the signals received (this can be formalized via a contradiction argument for an optimal information strategy). That is, V 1 and V 2 are dependent conditional on S such that the mutual information of V 1 and V 2 conditional on S,
, is non-zero. Then, the joint information is positive:
i.e., the information that only emerges from learning from the signal about both alternatives together
, the joint information is negative as evaluating both alternatives together is less informative after receiving the signal than before.
Corollary 1 generalizes the Shannon entropy based information cost functions utilized in the literature to non-uniform information cost structures. With this total cost function, the consumer is able to to optimize on her information channels and to learn about each alternative up to an optimal extent. She does so by selecting her information strategy f which solves the following problem.
7 For this reason, there is no notion of mutual information between three or more variables (Cover and Thomas 2006) .
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Optimization problem of the consumer. Find a joint distribution f on S and V that solves the following:
s.t.
where R (f ) and C (f ) are given in equations (2) and (7), respectively. 
Optimal Choice
In this section, we solve the optimization model given in (11)- (12), and describe the ensuing optimal choice probabilities. To this end, we follow the standard approach in rational inattention literature.
We first show that an optimal information strategy would generate only one posterior belief for each alternative. In other words, if an information strategy were to lead to the choice of a particular alternative under distinct posteriors, the consumer would have processed "unnecessary" information, and hence such a strategy would not be optimal. This enables us to restate the consumer's problem in terms of conditional choice probabilities directly. Solving this problem yields the characterization of the optimal choice behavior.
For a given information strategy f , we define the set of signals that lead to the choice of alternative i as
and i is chosen according to the tie-breaking rule if # arg max
} Accordingly, we calculate the conditional choice probability for alternative i given state v as
and the unconditional probability of choosing i as 
in (2), can now be expressed as
Note that the term p f (i) · f V|s i (v) specifies the joint probability that the state of nature V assumes the value v and that the consumer chooses alternative i. Hence, we also have
. Then, we can rewrite R(f ) as just a function of the conditional choice probabilities
Similarly, we can restate the cost C(f ) given in (7) as
where A denotes the random variable that takes value i ∈ A with probability p f (i). Here, we once again recognize that the consumer's choice behaviour, captured by the random variable A, is as informative about the state of nature V, as the signal space S leading to the consumer's choices, i.e.,
. As a result, using (13) and (14), we can express the objective function (11) directly as a function of the choice probabilities without making any implicit reference to the information strategy (even in the form of a subscript). The next proposition presents the resulting formulation to the consumer's choice problem. 
subject to
and
Next, we consider how one can go about solving this alternative formulation given in Proposition 1.
First note that this formulation is a concave maximization problem on a compact set. The objective
Here, D denotes the relative entropy, which is convex in the pair
f. Cover and Thomas 2006, Theorem 2.7.2).
Moreover, as we show in the Appendix,
Treating this case separately, the optimization problem essentially has one equality constraint, which allows us to obtain the structure of the optimal solution from the first order conditions of the Lagrangian. We present this result next in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For any information cost structure 0 < λ 1 ≤ λ 2 ≤ ... ≤ λ n < ∞, the consumer forms her information strategy such that the optimal conditional choice probabilities satisfy
almost surely.
We remark that (17) is derived for alternatives with a positive probability of being chosen, i.e., p (i) > 0, but it trivially holds for alternatives never chosen, i.e., p (i) = 0, as well. Notice also that the conditional choice probability in (17) resembles the GMNL formula -in fact, when information costs are identical, (18) becomes the exact GMNL expression in (4). It is more general in the sense that when information costs differ, the conditional choice probabilities are not only driven by state v, prior beliefs p(v) and unconditional probabilities p(i), but also by the partially conditional choice probabilities p (j | v 1··k )'s of selecting each alternative. To gain a better understanding of the implications, it is useful to rewrite (17) as where we define α i as
Written this way, the conditional probabilities follow a formula similar to the standard MNL, with the pay-off of each alternative shifted by the term α i . For the GMNL, α i simply equals log p(i),
implying that if an alternative is in general attractive, i.e., p(i) is relatively high, it can still be chosen with high probability even if its true value is low (Matějka and McKay 2015) . When the information costs are different, the consumer will typically know more about the cheaper alternatives, and this is reflected into the computation of how "attractive" the alternative is. Specifically, the shift term is a weighted average of the log transformations of the unconditional and partially conditional choice probabilities. Hence, a generally attractive alternative (with a relatively high p(i)) can be chosen with a low probability if the information obtained from studying an alternative with low cost (say Alternative 1) implies a low selection probability p (i | v 1 ), even if the true value is high.
The next proposition restates the consumer's choice problem in Proposition 1 using the structure of the conditional choice probabilities presented in Theorem 2. 
We should remark that the formulation in Proposition 2 offers a significant simplification over the initial formulation in (11)-(12) for finding the optimal information strategy. Nevertheless, solving for the optimal {p (i | v 1··n−1 )} i∈A can still be quite challenging when there are many alternatives and possible realizations of the values. Therefore, in what follows, we first examine some limiting cases and then present some illustrative examples to better understand the inattentive consumer's choice behavior facing alternatives with non-uniform information costs.
Limiting Scenarios and Choice Behavior
In the previous section, we characterized the optimal behaviour of customers for the most general case involving distinct alternatives with non-zero and finite information costs. There are some limiting scenarios that do not directly follow from the conditional choice probability equation (17) in Theorem 2. In this section, we focus on four such scenarios -infinite and zero information cost for some alternatives, and duplicate and dominated alternatives. Delving into these limiting cases also sheds some light on how non-uniform information costs impact the choices of inattentive consumers. To keep the exposition simple, we assume that the consumer chooses one of three alternative products -Product 1, Product 2, and Product 3 -with information costs of λ 1 ≤ λ 2 ≤ λ 3 , respectively (we provide the formulae for the general case in Appendix B). The conditional choice probabilities for these three alternatives can be expressed as:
for all i ∈ A = {1, 2, 3} and all
Infinite Information Cost. Suppose that it is infinitely costly (or prohibitively expensive)
for the consumer to process information about Product 3. This could represent a product for which the customer is not willing to acquire any information, or for which such information is not obtainable (e.g. product is not offered/available). Since, λ 3 = ∞ and
the consumer would have to set I f (V 3 , S | V 1 , V 2 ) = 0 under her optimal information strategy (to avoid an infinite information processing cost). Accordingly, the consumer does not update her priors beyond the information about Product 2. Then, from (16),
The above expression implies that the conditional choice probabilities do not depend on v 3 . However this does not mean that she makes decisions about Product 3 based on prior beliefs only. In fact, the customer updates her expectation of the value v 3 on the basis of information learned about
, the conditional choice probabilities in (19) can be rewritten as
for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} , where
Zero Information Cost (and Deterministic Alternatives). Suppose that the consumer can freely process all information for Product 1, i.e, λ 1 = 0. This could represent a product for which the customer can assign a true value very easily (e.g. a simple search good). Then, taking the limit of (19) with λ 1 → 0, we get
for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} .
Note that if the value of Product 1 is deterministic, i.e., V 1 = v 1 with probability 1, then
also reduces to the above expression for deterministic alternatives. This could represent a product about which the consumer is well-informed due to past experience, or the no-purchase alternative (reservation value). We remark however that only the functional form of the conditional choice probabilities are the same; the actual values of the conditional probabilities and resulting behavior are likely to differ. This is because learning about a deterministic alternative reveals no information about other alternatives. In contrast learning the exact value of an alternative can reveal significant information about other alternatives. More precisely, for a deterministic alternative, V 1 takes only one value, whereas alternatives with zero information cost can potentially take an arbitrary number of values. Hence the partially conditional purchase probabilities involving V 1 (e.g.
would average over all these potential values.
Next, we provide an example involving the above limiting scenarios to demonstrate the impact on consumer choice. for all v. Table 1 depicts the unconditional choice probability of choosing each alternative for different levels of information costs. Observe that each alternative is the best only in one of the three states, so under full information (Case 0), p(i) = (Case 1), then she would choose either Product 1 or Product 2, but never Product 3 since its expected value is lower that the other two (actually she is indifferent to Product 1 and 2, and here we assume she chooses each one with equal probability). At a first glance, it might seem intuitively appealing that reducing the information cost of either Product 1 or Product 2 should increase its choice probability, since the consumer would be able to more confidently assess it as the better of the two alternatives. However, this is not correct, as seen in Case 2. When λ 1 = 0.4, λ 2 = λ 3 = ∞, the consumer chooses Product 1 less (p(1) < p (2)). This is because with reduced information cost, the consumer is also able to learn with more confidence the states in which Product 1 is not the best alternative. Note that Product 3 is still not chosen since in expectation it is inferior to Product 2. However, this changes when the information cost of Product 2 is also reduced, as in Case 3 with λ 1 = λ 2 = 0.4 and λ 3 = ∞. Now, the consumer selects Product 1 and 2 with equal probability.
More interestingly, even though she does not process any information about Product 3 directly, from the implied information obtained through Product 1 and Product 2, she is able to identify cases where it is likely to be the best alternative. As a result, p(3) increases to 0.125.
Let us now explore the impact of freely available information. As seen in Case 4, when the consumer knows the exact value of Product 1, she chooses it only when v 1 = 1 (hence p(1) further reduces to 1/3). On the other hand, conditional on v 1 = 0, the expected value of Product 2 is higher than that of Product 3 and given that she processes information on Product 2, she chooses it with higher probability. Interestingly, the fact that she has perfect information about Product 1 mainly benefits Product 3. This is because in this example there are three products and only three states. Hence, it is sufficient for the DM to evaluate Product 1 and Product 2 independently (form opinions about each taking a non-zero value). Given that there are only 3 states possible, she need not process additional information to learn about Product 3. Consequently, knowing more confidently that she is facing states 2 or 3 does not significantly alter how she will process information about Product 2 (λ 2 is the same in Cases 3 and 4) -she still has to evaluate Product 2 and form opinion about its value being 1 or 0. Of course, if the cost of information for Product 2 reduces, she will be able to make this assessment better and the conditional choice probability for Product 2 would decrease, as confirmed by Case 5. The fact that the consumer does not need to process information about Product 3 beyond what she learns and infers through Product 1 and 2 is substantiated by Case 6. Comparing it with Case 3 confirms that λ 3 has no impact on the choice probability for this example (as long as it is equal or higher than λ 2 ).
Duplicate Alternatives. It has been shown that when the information costs are uniform, the resulting choice behavior of rationally inattentive consumers (i.e. GMNL) does not suffer from the IIA property. Specifically, Matějka and McKay (2015) establish that duplicate alternatives are 
We should mention that analogous equalities also hold for the unconditional choice probabilities in the above proposition. Further, the requirement that λȷ ≥ λ ȷ is critical -if processing information about the duplicate is cheaper than about the original alternative, the optimal choice may differ since more information is likely to be processed due to the availability of a cheaper information source. The above also implies that when duplicates exist in the choice set, it is possible to drop the ones with higher information costs from the set and determine the choice probability for the Such alternatives are never selected when the cost of information is uniform across alternatives (Matějka and McKay 2015) . It can be easily verified that this extends to the more general case of differentiated information costs (shifting the choice probability to the dominating alternative would increase the consumer's objective function). This does not mean information is not processed about a dominated alternative. As a matter of fact, whether a dominated alternative is available or not in the choice set can become relevant in the case of non-uniform information costs since it might serve as a cheap channel to learn about other alternatives, as is illustrated by the following example.
Example 2 (Strong Failure of Regularity) Consider a consumer visiting a retail store to buy a certain product (e.g. a smart phone) and choosing between either Product 1 or Product 2. She is well-informed about Product 1 based on past experience, which leads to a safe (deterministic) valuation of 1.0 as given in Table 2 . On the other hand, Product 2 might be better or worse than Product 1 such that there are two equally likely states (State 1 and State 2) corresponding to a higher and a lower value for Product 2 (either 1.2 or 0.6). Suppose that exploring Product 2 in the store is difficult (e.g. lack of sample product on display). Accordingly, let the information cost be λ 2 = 1. At this cost, she will not acquire information about Product 2 and simply buy Product 1 (refer to Table 2 ). Now suppose that the store adds Product 3 to its assortment. Although
Product 3 has most of the key features of Product 2 (e.g. operating system), it is inferior in some other elements (e.g. build quality, camera resolution). Overall, Product 2 dominates Product 3 in both State 1 and State 2. Assume that a sample for Product 3 is readily available in the store for customers to inspect, hence the consumer can learn about it at cost λ 3 = 0.2. Subsequently, the consumer also processes information about Product 2 by mainly inferring through Product 3. Although the consumer never chooses the dominated Product 3, the unconditional purchase probability of Product 2 increases from 0 to 0.29. The above example highlights failure of the regularity condition put forth by Luce and Suppes (1965) , which requires that adding a product to the choice set does not increase the market share of another product. Matějka and McKay (2015) show that a rationally inattentive consumer facing uniform information costs might fail the regularity condition. This is because introducing a new product can set incentives for the consumer to get information about the new product in a way that she is also informed about a previously "uninteresting" product. With this additional information, she might identify cases where she buys the previously uninteresting product. If the new product is inferior (i.e., dominated), however, the consumer would completely disregard the new product and also would not process any information about it. Hence, there is no failure of regularity under uniform information costs when the added product is dominated. In contrast, we show that nonuniform information costs can induce failure of regularity even if the inclusion is an inferior, neverselected alternative (hence our usage of the term strong failure of regularity).
There is a long standing discussion about the concept of failure of regularity. One explanation is the asymmetric dominance effect (Huber et al. 1982) , which requires that the inferior product is only dominated by one of the alternative products. Note that this is not the case in our example; Product 3 is dominated by both Product 2 and Product 1. Another popular explanation is extremeness aversion (Simonson and Tversky 1992) , where it is assumed that the consumer buys from the middle. Also menu/halo effects, where the addition of a product signals the quality of the producer, can induce strong failure of regularity (Luce and Raiffa 1957) . Such explanations suggest that the consumer's preferences somehow "change" by the introduction of further alternatives. In stark contrast, in our model, the consumer updates her belief about the value of the alternatives in a way that is completely consistent with her prior. 10 Rather, it is the rational inattentiveness of the customer, coupled with asymmetric information costs that leads to the strong failure of regularity.
To the best of our knowledge, this is a new explanation for this well-documented phenomenon.
General Choice Behavior: Red-Bus/Blue-Bus
We now demonstrate the choice behavior of rationally inattentive customers under a general setting with different degrees of correlations among the products and non-uniform information costs. For this purpose we consider the classic red-bus/blue-bus problem, and adopt the primary setup in Matějka and McKay (2015) . The inattentive consumer, whom we refer to as the decision-maker (DM) in this particular context, faces three alternatives -she may take the train (T ), the blue bus (B), or the red bus (R). (1 + ρ)
(1 + ρ) the values of the two buses (values of 0 and 1 indicate that the particular bus is "slow" or "fast", respectively).
Note that the speed of the train is deterministic (v T = . If the decision-maker were to choose an alternative without processing any information, she would be indifferent between the three alternatives, i.e., p(T ) = p(R) = p(B) = (1 + ρ) and p(R) = p(B) = 1 8 (3 − ρ) (see Figure 2a) . Clearly, since the buses are symmetric, they are chosen with equal probability, and this probability decreases as ρ increases (the DM believes increasingly that the buses are similar in speed). Figure 2b illustrates the subtle changes in the DM's choice behaviour when processing information is costly but the costs are symmetric (uniform), i.e., λ R = λ B = 0.4. As expected, the two buses are still always selected with equal probabilities, which are non-increasing in ρ. Furthermore, both buses are selected more by the DM, compared to the case with freely available information. In particular, when the DM has sufficiently strong belief that one of the buses must be fast, she does not consider the train as an option (this happens when ρ ≤ −0.31). Given that information processing is costly, due to her beliefs that the train is unlikely to be the best alternative, she instead allocates all her time and attention to understand which bus is faster (since the buses are symmetric, each bus is chosen with 50% chance). Now consider the scenario with asymmetric (non-uniform) information costs. Specifically, suppose that acquiring and processing information about the red bus is less expensive than about the blue bus for the DM, i.e., λ R ≤ λ B . Based on Proposition 2, the DM's choice is determined by the solution to the following optimization problem gets stronger with ρ, she also starts selecting the train. Interestingly, in this range the DM builds a stronger preference for the "cheap" red bus over the blue bus. This is because she acquires more information about the red bus and has more confidence about its speed compared to the blue bus. In particular, as ρ approaches 1, the DM believes that the buses have identical speed.
Consequently, whenever she decides to take a bus, she takes the red bus, on which she has more information. This signifies the importance of information provision for a seller in forming its product choice set. When the alternatives are very similar in the eyes of the DM, even a slight improvement in the provision of information for one product can significantly shift demand towards it. This is particularly stark considering that when ρ = 1, the DM treats duplicate alternatives jointly as one.
We can delineate the driving forces of this behavior by directly investigating the attention allocation and information acquisition strategies of the DM. For this purpose, Figure 3b depicts the mutual information and the conditional mutual information that is processed by the DM. Naturally, since the information is more readily available about the red bus, the DM learns more about it;
i.e., I(V R , S) > I(V B , S). Furthermore, part of what the DM learns about the blue bus is implied information, while the rest is direct information. The latter, which quantifies the amount of effort the DM spends to learn about the blue bus beyond what she can infer from studying the red bus, is the conditional mutual information
zero as ρ ↓ −1 and ρ ↑ 1. This is because, when ρ ↓ −1, the DM closely studies the red bus and if she concludes that it must be fast, she simply takes it, whereas if she concludes that it must be slow, she automatically takes the blue bus (since she simply infers and then strongly believes that it must be fast). On the other extreme, when ρ ↑ 1, the DM closely studies the red bus and if she concludes that it is most probably fast, she simply takes it, whereas if she concludes that it must be slow, she automatically takes the train (since she infers that the blue bus must be slow too).
In contrast, when ρ is around zero, the decision-maker cannot infer sufficient information about the blue bus through the information processed about the red bus, and decides to pay additional attention and acquire direct information about the blue bus to make the optimal choice.
In order to deepen our understanding of the DM's choice behaviour when information costs are asymmetric, we next focus on the conditional choice probabilities given in Figures 4 and 5. As seen in Figure 4a , even when the train is the best alternative, it is not selected by the DM for sufficiently negative ρ, ρ ≤ −0.47 (as previously explained). Moreover, in this range, her conditional belief for the red bus being slow yet the blue bus being fast is decreasing in ρ. Therefore, the conditional choice probability of red bus (resp. blue bus) increases (resp. decreases) in ρ. On the other hand, for ρ > −0.47, the train is also chosen and the decision-maker increasingly prefers the train and avoids the buses as ρ increases. Further she also learns that both buses are more likely to be slow mainly by processing direct information about the (cheaper) red bus. Hence, as long as ρ ≤ 0.60, the DM takes the red bus less often than the blue bus. Interestingly, for high levels of ρ, when the DM erroneously believes that the red bus is fast, she also infers that the blue bus must also be fast but since she is more informed about the red bus, she takes it. In this case, the Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) blue bus is rarely chosen. In contrast, when both buses are fast, i.e., v R = v B = 1, as in Figure 4b , the DM always prefers the red bus over the blue bus due to its information advantage. In this case, she rarely makes the wrong decision by taking the train. Further, only if the correlation ρ is around zero, the DM processes direct information about both buses and may follow a positive signal concerning the blue bus when receiving an erroneous negative signal about the red bus. The selection probability of the blue bus is highest in this range, i.e., the information cost disadvantage for a fast blue bus is low if little can be inferred about it from knowing the red bus. Conditional choice probabilities for red bus/blue bus when the two buses are equally fast Figure 5a confirms that the DM most often makes the right choice when information processing is cheap for the fast bus (red bus) and expensive for the slow bus (blue bus), i.e., v R = 1 and v B = 0. As shown in Figure 5b , this remains the case even if it is harder to acquire information about the fast bus v R = 0 and v B = 1, provided that the DM has negatively correlated beliefs. When the DM increasingly believes the buses to be similar (ρ increases), however, the likelihood of taking the blue bus decreases sharply. This is because the DM has more information about the slow red bus, and since the buses are very similar according to her beliefs, she draws the inference that the blue bus must also be slow. She instead increasingly chooses the train (and makes the wrong decision). In the extreme case, ρ ≥ 0.95 the likelihood of her taking the correct blue bus is even less than the red bus.
From the above discussion, it is clear that reducing the information cost of an alternative results in more information to be processed by the DM. This means that the net-payoff to the DM also improves after optimal processing of information. However, it is also evident that this does not mean that the DM makes more correct choices all the time. To highlight this fact, we depict in Figure 6 , the , 0, 1)
Figure 5 Conditional choice probabilities for red bus/blue bus when the two buses are different conditional probability of taking "a bus" (red or blue). We know that when the decision maker faces uniform information costs (λ R = λ B = 0.4), she takes the bus too often (see also Figure 2 and the related discussion). One could conjecture that reducing the information cost of even one alternative increases the amount of information processed, so it should bring this probability close to the perfect information case (λ R = λ B = 0). From Figure 6 , it is evident that this is only partially correct. For negative correlation levels, the DM more correctly identifies the train as the fastest alternative.
However, at positive correlation levels a new decision bias is created. Since the DM knows more about the bus with the lower cost, she starts drawing strong (and wrong) inferences about the other bus, and this time she ends up taking the Train too often. Reducing the information cost of the blue bus so that information costs are uniform again (λ R = λ B = 0.2) eliminates this decision bias and brings the conditional choice probability of choosing either bus closer to the perfect information case for all levels of ρ. This highlights the benefits that a seller can potentially earn from presenting information about different choice alternatives in a rather similar and uniform manner.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we develop a consumer choice model where rationally inattentive customers choose among a given set of alternatives. Our novel contribution is the incorporation of information costs that differ among the alternatives. This captures the notion that it might be inherently (or by seller design) more difficult to learn about some alternatives than about others. We axiomatically derive an information cost function that distinguishes between direct and implied information obtained by the consumer from studying each alternative, and that prioritizes the use of cheaper sources in the acquisition and processing of information. This conditional mutual information based function generalizes the Shannon cost functions commonly utilized in the rational inattention literature. We analyze the choice problem of the consumer and show that the optimal choice behavior can be characterized analytically. When the unit cost of acquiring information is the same across all alternatives, the choice behavior reduces to the GMNL choice studied by Matějka and McKay (2015) . According to the optimal choice behavior, the conditional choice probability associated with each alternative depends on realized values of the alternatives, their information costs, and prior beliefs. Although the exact relationship is non-trivial, essentially the relative "attractiveness" of each alternative is adjusted by the fact that the consumer learns more about the alternatives with lower information costs. Accordingly, if the information obtained by these alternatives imply a higher (or lower) likelihood of selecting a particular alternative, it is weighed into the attractiveness of that alternative appropriately.
We study a number of limiting scenarios and typical examples to illustrate the optimal choice behavior, and show that non-uniform information costs can induce complex consumer behaviour.
Accordingly, the consequences for the seller depend on the particular situation. Although an asymmetric reduction of information costs yields an overall better-informed consumer, the consumer's beliefs can become strongly biased by focusing on a particular information channel. Perhaps surprisingly, there are situations where the market share of a product may increase when it becomes harder to learn about it. Our characterization enables us to verify if such changes (perhaps due to alterations in the information provision strategy of the seller) would lead to more correct (or incorrect) choices for the consumer, and can be used to evaluate the benefits (or losses) to the seller. We also identify that if two products are very similar in nature, a difference in information costs typically leads to a striking change in relative market share. This is because the consumer then mainly relies on information about the product with low information cost and forms her belief about the product with high information cost based on implied information. As both products are Determining this requires a consumer demand model that describes how choices are going to be made when the cost of information differs among the alternatives and the consumer is rational and efficient when evaluating her alternatives. Going a step of further, such sellers face the trade-off between displaying more alternatives on the same page with less related information (high information costs) versus less alternatives but with more available information (low information costs). Our choice model has the potential to serve as the building block of such product assortment, ordering and strategic information provisioning decisions.
It is worth pointing out that real-life practical applications of our consumer choice model would benefit from two key developments. The first one pertains to the empirical validation of rational inattention and estimation of the choice model. Fortunately, there is a fast growing recent interest in the economics literature on rational inattention and breakthroughs are being made in both theoretical and empirical directions. In recent work, Caplin and Dean (2015) describe a method to identify whether a decision maker is rational inattentive or not from state dependent choice data.
In a similar vein, Oliveira et al. (2016) 
we get
since the ratio of the conditionals within the log terms remains the same when restricting the domain to
Using (20)- (22), this can be further simplified to
Since we have multiple posteriors on S 1 i ∪ S 2 i , it cannot be true that for all ℓ ∈ A, S and V 1··ℓ are independent conditional on V 1··ℓ−1 . Hence, there exists ℓ for which the last term is strictly positive. But then I f * (V ℓ , S | V 1··ℓ−1 ) − I h (V ℓ , S | V 1··ℓ−1 ) > 0, implying that h is strictly cheaper than f * ; a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1
According to Lemma 1, an optimal information strategy f necessitates a single posterior for all signals s ∈ S i . Thus, the revenue function becomes ∫
Moreover, define for an optimal information strategy f the random variable A f that takes the value i with the probability that i is chosen under f , Pr (A f = i) = p f (i). The distribution of V conditional on S is the same as the distribution of V conditional on A f , hence knowing A f is as informative about V as knowing S, i.e., I f * (V ℓ , S | V 1··ℓ−1 ) = I f * (V ℓ , A f * | V 1··ℓ−1 ) . Formally, this can be shown as follows:
The cost of information can now be written asĉ
, we can write the objective in terms of {p f (i | v 1··ℓ )} i∈A . Thus, every optimal information strategy f induces choice probabilities p f that also maximize
On the other hand, let {p * (i | v)} i∈A be a collection that solves the problem in the proposition. Select n distinct signals {ŝ i } i∈A . Define f * by
otherwise.
Then, f * is an optimal strategy according to (11) and (12). To see this, note that f * is consistent with the priors and induces choice probabilities that maximizes the objective in the proposition. Since every other optimal strategy induces choice probabilities that maximize objective in the proposition, there cannot be a strategy that yields a higher payoff then f * .
Proof of Theorem 2
We already proved the general case allowing for λ h+1 = · · · = λ n = ∞. The parameters λ h+1 , . . . , λ n appear in the respective mutual information terms (16) in the optimization problem of Proposition 1. Setting these terms to zero implies p (i | v 1··j−1 ) = p (i | v 1··j ) for all i and all j ∈ {h + 1, . . . , n} . The objective then becomes
for i > h, and insertion of the equation
yields the Lagrangian for i ≤ h, while for i > h we obtain
for i ≤ h and (24)
